Is European Federation Inevitable?
The European Union has bound together the founding states of some of recent history’s greatest Kingdoms and Empires: France, Germany, Spain, and more.
Brought together by the brutal and destructive aftermath of the Second Great War to pool together vital resources necessary to rebuild; to stand in solidarity against the encroachment of Communist Russia; and to prevent such a cataclysmic conflict among brother nations from ever occurring on the continent again; the European Union has brought about an era of peace, development, and cooperation quite unlike anything seen prior.
Today the EU as a collective rivals China for the position of second largest economy on the planet. It boasts a population of over 400 million, outshining its American counterpart. Hosts almost half of the world’s 140 most successful companies. And, thanks to the likes of France, technically stands as a nuclear power.
While it is often disregarded as merely an economic alliance or some lesser non-state entity, the EU has repeatedly demonstrated both desires and efforts to establish an ever closer union between its member states, a concept ingrained in its founding documents, and repeated in major treaties ever since. Truly the once Coal and Steel Community of France, Italy, West Germany, and the BeNeLux state has seen its purpose evolve beyond pure financial pragmatism, to a much higher degree of cooperation and integration for the sake of mutual security, progress, prosperity, and the ultimate building of a shared vision for the future.
But as the years have carried on, and the Union expanded, this vision had become lost or unappealing to certain members, most especially to newer members who pursued membership purely for financial means, or for the sake of not being left alone between the EU and Russia. Nations like Poland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and of course, the United Kingdom, had, from their entry, maintained a firm opposition to Federalization, and sought exceptions from various European policies, which flies in the face of integration efforts, and has led to the concept of a two-speed Europe, in which those who favor integration can continue to pursue it unhindered within and between their own countries, while those hesitant or resistant can continue at their present pace, with the theory being that those truly incompatible with a United Europe will eventually break off but remain close allies, while those who simply need more time will eventually accept integration with ease.
The exit of the UK from the European Union has, of course, raised questions as to whether or not other states will follow, and if this might in fact signal the end of the EU; however, unless other major factors press upon the EU’s stability, it seems highly unlikely, even in the face of a fracturing away of some states, that a total collapse of the Union will occur, or that its efforts at closer Union will be significantly impeded. Its even questionable, though not entirely unlikely, that more states will break away, as despite various disagreements with EU policy from newer members such as Poland and Hungary, most member states do not appear to have any real desire to leave the Union, and in fact, hold highly favorable views of the European Union as an entity, most surprisingly with Poland at the very top of this list.
The issue, rather, appears to be not with a Union between these states, but the manner in which this Union is conducted, and the direction in which it should move. Poles, Germans, Lithuanians, Spaniards, Swedes, and Hungarians for example all feel as though the Union is highly beneficial to their country, be it for purposes of security, wealth, or what have you, but only Germans and Spaniards out of this particular grouping have demonstrated strong desires to further integrate, while the others have stated their opinions of the EU would become significantly less positive if integration were to be pursued, and that they would even seek out a British style exit. It would thus appear that so long as there is opportunity to benefit from the EU without the need to concede a certain level of sovereignty to them, states like Poland, Hungary, and Sweden will continue to remain, assert their distinctiveness as much as possible, and are prepared to withdraw should that be threatened.
The Union’s core member states include Germany, France, Italy, the BeNeLux countries, and most recently has come to include the likes of Spain, Portugal, Austria, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Outside of this, Ireland, the Baltic States, Finland, Greece, and Cyprus have taken the initiative to adopt the Euro as their currency, further integrating them into the EU system, however, for a multitude of reasons, remain outside the EU core: For all of these countries, geographic disconnect from the core members is a contributing factor to this unofficial status. Further Ireland’s unique relationship with the UK because of Northern Ireland reinforces its need for exceptions to typical EU policy; Cyprus finds itself in a contested position between ethnically Greek and Turkish populations; Greece has faced a number of financial difficulties since its entry into the EU, which have led some to consider it in need of additional reform and development before it can join the core EU members; Finland generally finds itself more closely interconnected with its Scandinavian and Baltic neighbors, the latter of whom, along with Finland itself, are significantly removed from the EU core, and more deeply impacted by the geopolitics of Eastern Europe, as opposed to the EU Core members which, with two exceptions, share a common Western European background.
Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia also appear to be on track to adopt the Euro, which would bring them further along the integration process, but Hungary, Sweden, the Czech Republic, and Poland all appear to be stalling the process within their own countries for as long as they can, something which signals a hesitance to accept a closer Union, which, when we also consider various social factors within these countries, reinforces the theory that they will eventually become break-aways, which, if this is the case, would make integration with the Baltic countries all the more difficult because of their significant disconnect.
While the EU’s newer members are obligated to adopt the Euro once they meet a certain criteria, Denmark has permanently opted out of adopting the Euro, significantly hindering the chances of them integrating into a Federalized Union. Denmark’s interests in the EU have historically remained economic, and in fact, tied to the UK’s own membership, having joined only shortly after them. While the Danes may not pursue an exit strategy any time soon, they are likely to be one of those incompatible states that simply break-off to focus on themselves, something reinforced by their historically closer ties to Scandinavia than to Western Europe.
Ireland, depending upon neighboring circumstances with the UK, could go either way, but only as a united island, as British control of Northern Ireland and the ability to restrict travel across the Irish border gives them a say in how integrated Ireland can become if they wish to retain their current travel arrangement.
Greece, Cyprus, and the potential member state of Turkey are something of a powder-keg for the EU, as the accepting of Turkey into the Union is sure to upset other resistant members, and potentially trigger an early exit, perhaps most especially from Greece, who already feels as though the EU has weakened their economy, and holds a historic and present animosity with Turkey. Regardless of the whether Greece remains or Turkey joins, the divided nature of Cyprus will make it a hot subject in need of defusing by the EU before it can consider further integrating it.
The Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, and Austrians generally find themselves opposed to the West’s ideologies, and have resisted integration on social matters. These countries, once again, have demonstrated exceptional resistance to the idea of Federalization, and must be considered as potential break-aways.
Now perhaps most interestingly, and impactful is the increasing hesitance from the core members of France and Italy.
Following the withdrawal of Britain, Italy has been the loudest core opponent to integration, broadly opposing EU ideology, and feeling as though the EU has negatively impacted their economy, so much so that calls to abandon the Euro or leave the Union entirely have been floated around for a few years by this point.
Despite this, we’ve seen repeatedly that parties in favor of an Italexit have backed up from this policy upon gaining power, suggesting there might be more keeping the Italians invested in the union than meets the eye. Though that being said, if conditions within the EU were to become less favorable for Italy, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that they might break away, and though this would dampen the Union’s strength, it would not be enough to bring about its collapse.
France, on the other hand, is a very essential part of the EU plan, and their loss would drive a significant wedge between the member states to its east and west.
The French have ranked among those with the most unfavorable opinions of EU policy, standing alongside the likes of the UK, Italy, Greece, and the Czech Republic. The French are, naturally, a major contributor to the European Union, and certainly feel the strain of so significant a leadership position; French citizens simply feel as though they are shouldering too much of a burden from other member states, and from poor choices made by their own government. But while the EU’s popularity has fallen remarkably low, French desire to remain a part of the Union actually appears to have risen in the last few years, once again suggesting, as has been the case for many EU countries, a dissatisfaction with the Union’s policy, but not the Union itself.
A significant change in Europe’s dynamics are occurring, and will occur over the next few years, during which a number of these political shortcomings could be expected to be addressed, thus resolving much of the dissatisfaction among member states. It should also be expected that as new institutions and integrated systems are established, more and more incompatible states will be weened out, perhaps even with the support of the EU, as it grows more confident in its expanding core.
One might even see some similarities between the EU and the early United States, with core states being much like Federalist New England, and the resistant or outsider states being more like the Pro-Decentralization Democratic-Republican South. If that is in fact the case, Europe could be approaching a cross-road that will usher in a new era of Federalization or see the expansion of the Union at the cost of decentralizing policies that return more autonomy to the member states.
Is the Federalization of Europe inevitable? It appears very possible, and even likely, though if it were to occur, would not be the European Union in its entirety as we know it today. There is still much to be seen, but if past trends have been any indicator, it would seem a far closer union between the states of western Europe may just occur within our lifetimes.
