Is The Russo-American Alliance Inevitable?

Monsieur Z
7 min readDec 21, 2021

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The United States and Russia, despite their recent history of rivalry, potentially stand as one another’s most valuable allies in the next few decades.

Most political analysts would probably breakdown the chief alliances of the modern day along Eastern and Western lines; that is, first and foremost, the United States and the European Union on one side, and Russia and China on the other; perhaps with the inclusion of some Pacific powers for the West, and some Middle Eastern powers for the East.

These relationships, however, quickly appear to be reaching their strategic terminus. That is, in simpler terms, they either are, or will soon be outliving their usefulness.

Let’s first take a look at Russia and China; during the height of the Cold War, these two were the essential leaders of the Global Communist Bloc, and since then have remained relatively close despite periods of disagreement, and Russia’s departure from Communist ideology. Today Russia stands as the world’s biggest country by geography, and retains the largest nuclear arsenal on the planet, though outside of this, ranks roughly on par with China militarily. The Chinese boast a population of over 1 Billion, as well as the second largest economy on the planet. The Russians as the Soviet Union once stood as the clear senior member of this partnership, however, have since been relegated to China’s equal at best, and at worst, have themselves become the junior partner.

Despite Russia holding multiple valuable interests within Europe, both it and China are deeply invested in gaining greater influence within Asia. Once controlling lands as far south as Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, and aiming to go as far as to reach the Indian ocean, the Russians now find this land falling further under Chinese sway, as their political and economic dominance allows them to influence policy and push through projects that further strengthen China’s position in the greater Asian sphere.

It’s very evident that China is outshining Russia across Central Asia, and with an economy and population growing at such a rapid pace, there are legitimate concerns from Russia that China might one day turn against it. It is for these reasons that Russia, while friendly with China, has hesitated to invest itself in a more concrete alliance with this quasi-rival of theirs. At the moment, China stands to benefit from Russia’s strength, and Russia from China’s wealth; the two united by a common opposition to the Western Bloc, both its ideology, and supremacy on the global scene; but the facts paint a clear picture of China’s pace eventually putting them ahead of Russia to such a degree that they might simply discard them if the Russians ever became an inconvenience. Regardless of whether or not that will be the case, it is in Russia’s best interest to either pursue its own advancement at China’s expense to at the very least remain competitive, or to seek a more concrete and enriching partnership with a state whose interests don’t conflict with its own.

Now as for the US and EU, the relationship between these two is quite interesting.

The United States holds at its disposal the world’s most powerful military and economy. The EU, as a single unit, isn’t far behind in the latter regard, standing as the world’s third largest economy, rivaling China for that position, and boasts a collective population even greater than that of the US. The two have generally remained militarily intertwined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization first established during the Cold War as a deterrent to Russian aggression, and which has since become the basis of European collective security given its inclusion of most EU member states.

It was understood during these early years that Europe, then not quite as integrated as it is under the modern EU, and still recovering from the effects of World War Two, would stand as the junior partner in their relationship with the United States, whose economy and infrastructure, rather than see destruction from the war, actually boomed as war production revitalized American industry; NATO was, in essence, America’s warning to Soviet Russia not to intervene in the anti-communist West.

Since then, much has changed, as Europe has not only recovered, but now carries more potential than it ever has; not longer pitted against itself by rival imperial disputes.

The fall of Russia’s Soviet Union only reinforced the EU’s secure position on the geopolitical scene, and has now left it more willing to challenge US policy, and pursue agendas independent of American interests, no longer feeling dependent upon them in an increasingly less militaristic, and more economically-driven geopolitical landscape, where in which they themselves feel capable of standing as an essential equal to the US. This soft schism between Europe and America has understandably led to clashes of policy, and a dialing back of meaningful collaboration against their larger rivals of China and Russia, who’ve respectively become the prime rivals of the US and EU; that is that with the fall of the Soviet Union, American interest in Russia as an adversary has waned, as the Russians are now largely relegated to a regional power; this in turn has made them Europe’s foremost rival, whilst the United States has become increasingly focused upon the rising power of China, who already stands capable of threatening American interests in the Pacific.

Despite this greater sense of capability, the European Union, in the absence of the United States and the military shield of NATO, is quite vulnerable, most especially to Russia, who has long sought to reclaim its hold on the now EU-member states of the Baltics, as well as to reassert its dominance over the generally pro-western but more accurately anti-Russian Ukraine.

The US is hands down the largest contributor to NATO, and as you might imagine given NATO’s original purpose, this has led the US to essentially subsidize the EU’s defense budget for years, to the point that the US and Britain, who is, of course, no longer a member of the EU, contribute more to NATO’s budget than the entirety of the EU combined. Perhaps in the age of the Cold War this would be acceptable. Perhaps if Russia posed a legitimate threat to immediate American interests, this would be acceptable. If the EU was closer in line with American policy, this would be acceptable. But simply, it is not. The European Union is not an extension of America, and both parties acknowledge that; they have their own spheres of focus, and visions of the future to fulfill. And despite efforts by American politicians to cater toward the European Agenda, the truth is that NATO is no longer practical, and if anything, is a tremendous risk, both in that it siphons away American resources, and that it could threaten to pull America into a strictly European war on the basis that an attack on one is an attack on all.

The Europeans themselves, France and Germany especially, have acknowledged this, and have according moved for the establishment of their own united armed forces, as well as the further integration of the Union into a proper state with the authority to provide for its own defense, and secure its collective borders.

So how does this connect back to a Russo-American alliance? Plainly, there are few if any matters in which direct Russian and American interests conflict. Both countries are massive land empires whose histories have largely consisted of isolated self-focus, with the ambition of expanding their contiguous lands, and furthering their self-sufficiency.

There do exist conflicts between their allies, but with the days of the Soviet Union long gone, there aren’t many reasons for the US and Russia to remain at one another’s necks. The two could theoretically expand their domains to encompass the extremes of what have historically been their desired claims, and still they would not directly conflict with one another, though some allied concessions may occur.

Truly, the United States is the only presently existing Great Power Russia can have such an arrangement with, as both Europe and China, threaten to encroach on its land, while a more stand-alone power like India could halt Russia’s influence southward.

A similar thing could be said of the United States, though to a much lesser degree, as while no nation threatens its position on the continent, Europe’s essential monopoly on it’s half of the Atlantic will naturally make this ocean a competition zone once Europe goes its own way, just as the Pacific has become on account of rising Chinese power.

Because Russia is unlikely to fully subdue both China and Europe, the chances of it becoming a competitor to America in these waters on a level equal to China or Europe are very low, it would, however, preoccupy them, and diminish their influence while boosting its own.

Russia and the United States are in a unique military position as well. While China and Europe may rival the United States economically, and surpass Russia in this regard, military might still remains firmly within America’s grasp, while the two of them possess the largest nuclear arsenals on the planet by far; together there is no adversary they cannot overcome. If they were to establish a military alliance, and pursue joint operations for their own mutual or respective interests, they would quite literally be unstoppable.

Russia and the United States are no longer guided by ideologies irreconcilable with one another, and increasingly the US is demonstrating fatigue with its involvement in the Old World, needing a partner more assertive and more proactive in solving regional issues than the bureaucratic and diplomatic EU, who has long distinguished itself by its preference of soft power to hard power.

Is the Russo-American alliance inevitable? No, but it certainly is possible. Efforts have continuously been made by the Putin administration to facilitate Russo-American rapprochement, but for one reason or another, these efforts have continued to produce few results, but of course, things could always change.

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Monsieur Z
Monsieur Z

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